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SO HOW MUCH SHOULD I GIVE? 
EXTENDING CLASS COVERAGE OF SINGER’S WORK ON POVERTY ETHICS 
 
PETER MURPHY 




For over forty years now, Peter Singer’s writings on poverty ethics have been widely assigned in 
undergraduate philosophy courses. They include “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, the classic 
1972 essay that has been reprinted in over thirty-five different anthologies; “Rich and Poor” a 
frequently anthologized essay initially published in 1980 as a chapter in Singer’s book Practical 
Ethics; “The Singer Solution to World Poverty,” a 1999 essay from The New York Times; 
parts of his 2004 book One World: The Ethics of Globalization; and his 2009 book The Life 
You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty.1 The popularity of this work in philosophy 
courses is well justified: Singer’s arguments are accessible to beginning philosophy students, 
those arguments are powerful, and their conclusions mark a deep and disturbing challenge to 
how virtually everyone in our society lives. It is hard to think of philosophical writing that is as 
accessible to beginning students and does a better job of illustrating the revisionary power of 
philosophy and the implications that philosophical reflection can have for how we live.  
This paper outlines a unit that builds on the momentum gained by a standard unit on 
this work.2 The standard unit that I have in mind is one that covers Singer’s pond analogy, his 
well-known three-premise argument, and his replies to various objections.2 For my standard 
unit, I use the opening two chapters of The Life You Can Save, but much of the same material 
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is covered in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” and “Rich and Poor,” though with different 
emphases.3  
I have used the unit that I will outline here in a general introduction to philosophy 
course and in a first-year seminar on the ethics of poverty.4 It is also suitable for use in a 
general ethics course, a survey course in applied ethics, as well as courses on narrower topics 
such as utilitarianism, consequentialism, and Singer’s work.  
The focus of the unit that I will outline is a set of attempts to answer the question: 
exactly how much of our money, including the money that we can raise from liquidating our 
possessions, are we morally required to share with the world’s poorest people? Possible answers, 
as we will see, differ greatly, ranging from a penny in one’s entire life (no matter how affluent 
one is), to all of one’s personal wealth, to all of one’s personal wealth plus what one can acquire 
by theft.  
There are at least four important ways that this unit can benefit students. First, it can 
deepen their interest in poverty ethics. Second, as we will see, it is full of opportunities for 
students to generate points in favor of and against the sharing principles that are at the core of 
the unit and to think through the practical implications of these points. Third, along the way 
students can gain greater facility with some important concepts, such as marginal utility, long-
run versus short-run payoffs, and various concepts of significance. And, fourth, it provides 
opportunities for students to reflect on some key issues in ethics, such as the issue of whether 
our moral obligations to assist someone are affected by the apathy of others who are also in a 
position to assist that person.  
Published in APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 14 (2014): 7-14. Page 3 of 26 
	   3	  
 My presentation of the unit, and some tips for effectively teaching it, begins with a 
discussion of the question that frames the unit. Then I turn to the five sharing principles each 
of which yields a different answer to this question, and offer some remarks about how to 
effectively cover each principle. 
 
1. The How Much Question 
A good place to start the unit is with two questions. Each uses jargon from the earlier standard unit. 
Someone in absolute affluence has enough money (or in-kind resources) to cover her basic needs 
and has money (or in-kind resources) left over for luxury items. Someone in absolute poverty does 
not have enough money (or in-kind resources) to cover her basic needs. Examples of basic needs are 
proper nutrition, health care, shelter, clothing, and sanitation; in general, basic needs are things 
without which people are far more likely to die.5   
Here are the two questions: 
1. The whether question: Are people in absolute affluence morally required to share any of 
their money and possessions with people in absolute poverty? 
2. The how much question: How much of their money and possessions are absolutely 
affluent people morally required to share with people in absolute poverty?6 
In my experience, almost all students believe that the correct answer to the whether question is a 
pretty obvious ‘yes’. Whether this response is justified depends in part on what kinds of 
considerations were covered in the earlier standard unit. My present focus though is on identifying 
dispositions that students often have (whether they are justified or not) after completing the standard 
unit and starting the unit that I am focusing on. The view that we are not under any moral obligation 
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to share our wealth with the world’s poorest people even though they are innocent and they will die 
horrible  premature deaths if we do nothing, strikes many students as selfish, callous, and morally 
wrong. By the lights of many students, views (most notably libertarian ones) that imply otherwise are 
thereby reduced to absurdity. By contrast, in my experience, these students find the how much 
question quite pressing since it is not obvious what the correct answer to it is, and since the answer 
sets the moral bar that we need to meet.7 
 Still it is important to engage students who think the correct answer to the whether question 
is that we are not morally required to share any of our resources with the world’s poor. One way to 
do this is to challenge these students to complete the following statement: if those in absolute 
affluence have a moral obligation to share their resources with those in absolute poverty, then the 
amount of resources that they are obligated to share is X. This will be a familiar exercise in 
counterfactual reasoning: courses (including non-philosophy courses) are filled with such exercises, 
as students think through the implications of views other than their own.8 And there can be a payoff 
for these students. Once they identify the value for X, they may have the beginning of an argument 
against Singer’s answer to the whether question. Most obviously, this will be so if the value of X is 
objectionably demanding (an issue that I return to below).    
One way to begin discussion of the how much question is with tithing. A common tithe, 
in fact the very meaning of the word, requires people to give 10% of their income to some 
cause. Here students might begin by considering the view that each affluent person is morally 
required to give 10% of his or her income to those in absolute poverty. Students can evaluate 
this answer to the how much question as part of a homework assignment, class discussion, or a 
group exercise. Expect them to identify some possible problems with this approach. One may 
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be that it comes with no justification. Why is that the correct amount? Why isn’t it higher, or 
lower?   Another possible problem is that the requirement of a fixed percentage of a person’s 
income rather than a sliding percentage of it is contentious and in need of support.  Perhaps, as 
is arguably true with an income tax system, those with more ought to contribute a greater 
percentage than those with less. But this too will have to be supported. A third possible 
problem is with the focus on income rather than wealth as the determinant of how much one 
should give. A tithe that applies only to income suggests that a person of wealth but no income 
is not morally required to share some of his or her resources. But if that person’s wealth is 
enormous, this may strike some as implausible, and in need of justification. 
Discussion of the above issues is helpful at the beginning of the unit for it moves 
students beyond familiar pat answers and it can help to generate some important questions that 
they can ask of each subsequent sharing principle.  
 
2. The Principle of Noncomparable Signficance 
It is natural to start with the two sharing principles that Singer devotes the most attention to. 
Since he discusses these principles in some detail, there will probably be considerable overlap 
with what I say here and what is covered in the earlier standard unit. Still I hope this discussion 
includes some novel points.9  
Singer discusses, and then rejects, a principle that in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, 
he called “the weak version of the principle of preventing bad outcomes”. It is: “If it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally 
significant, we ought, morally, to do it.”10 Applying this only to money and material possessions, 
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and using a more descriptive title gets us a principle that I call “The Principle of 
Noncomparable Significance”: 
PNS: An absolutely affluent person is morally required to donate to those in 
absolute poverty his or her money, and the money that can be raised from 
liquidating possessions, as long as (i) those donations will prevent something bad 
from happening and (ii) what is donated is not morally significant. An absolutely 
affluent person is not morally required to share money or to liquidate 
possessions that are morally significant. 
 
The key concept here is a thing’s being ‘morally significant.’ To help students grasp this 
concept, one can have them identify examples of everyday claims that feature this concept. It 
shows up, for example, in “it is of no moral significance to me whether we get mushrooms on 
our pizza,” “it is of moral significance to me whether we get meat on our pizza,” and “my 
family is of great moral significance to me.”  
What determines whether something is morally significant?11  It is worthwhile having 
students discuss this question in some detail, both because it is important in its own right and 
because it is crucial for evaluating PNS. Expect a variety of answers to come up. One answer is 
that whether something is morally significant is a matter of whether it is essential for carrying 
out one’s main life-projects. Another is that it is a matter of whether it is among the things that 
one most desires. As these (and other) answers are discussed, students can apply them to see 
what the resulting versions of PNS imply about what we should give to the world’s poor. To 
make this concrete, students can be asked to imagine two baskets, one labeled THINGS 
ESSENTIAL TO MY MAIN LIFE PROJECTS and the other labeled THINGS NOT 
ESSENTIAL TO MY MAIN LIFE-PROJECTS. Students can list a few of their possessions 
and sums of money that they would put into each, and state why they would do so. They can 
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do the same, now with baskets labeled THINGS I MOST DESIRE and THINGS I DO NOT 
MOST DESIRE. 
It is also important to discuss clause (i) of PNS. Notice that the modifier “morally” is 
not included in this clause. So this clause covers all bad things, even those that are not morally 
bad. Students can be asked to work out what falls in this generic category of bad things.  Is it 
restricted to intrinsically bad things or does it also include instrumentally bad things?  Are there 
things that are bad but not morally bad? If so, what are some examples of such things?  
We now turn to objections to the PNS principle. Here it is helpful to have students, 
either individually, in small groups, or as a whole class, try to identify and evaluate objections to 
this principle.  Expect a variety of objections to be raised to this sharing principle, as well as to 
the subsequent ones that we will look at.  
Students often object to PNS on the grounds that people can say anything is morally 
significant to them. A rich person might say her collection of BMWs is morally significant to 
her. This seems to allow people to rationalize and get themselves off the hook too easily. It is 
important to point out that PNS is not about what people can say; it is about whether 
something really is morally significant to them. These are importantly different.  
There is however a similar objection that is more serious. It says that on any plausible 
interpretation of moral significance, there are people who have BMW collections that really are 
morally significant to them. This is so for both the life-project and the strong-desire 
interpretations of moral significance (as well as for other interpretations that students might 
suggest). Preserving and expanding one’s BMW collection can be among a person’s strongest 
desires, and it can be integral to a person’s main life-projects. (Of course this will not be true of 
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all people who collect BMWs. But it will be true of some of them.)The objection to PNS might 
rest, then, not on the claim that collecting BMWs cannot be morally significant for someone 
but rather that even if the having of BMWs is morally significant to a particular person, it 
would be wrong to collect them when their sale could be used to save the lives of others 
because owning BMWs is of less moral significance than saving innocent people’s lives.12 The 
move to the last of these claims might be worthy of further discussion. 
A third objection is that sometimes we are not morally required to sacrifice items that 
may be of significance but not of moral significance.  Here is an illustration I have used 
effectively in class. Suppose a man is wearing a special pair of shoes when he walks by a pond 
in which a child is drowning. The shoes are the only material things that connect this man to 
his brother who recently died in a tragic house fire. All of his brother’s physical possessions 
perished in the fire except this pair of shoes (which his brother left elsewhere). The passerby 
only wears these shoes for good luck and today is such a day as it is his first day at a new job. 
This is a paradigm case of a material object that is of significance to someone--indeed, of great 
personal importance to him though we--and he--would not say that the shoes have moral 
significance for him. Suppose the man knows that  he can only save the child if he acts quickly 
and so doesn’t have time to take off the shoes if he is to jump into the lake in time to save the 
child from drowning. He knows that if he goes into the water with the shoes on, they will be 
ruined. Almost all students think it is pretty obviously wrong for the man to ignore the 
drowning child in order to preserve the shoes, and thereby let the child die. The man is morally 
obligated to save the child even if this means his special shoes are ruined. However since the 
shoes are (we are supposing) not of moral significance, PNS stands. 
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Given the objections one might raise to PNS, I then turn to consider some competing 
principles to see if there is one that fares better than PNS. 
 
3. The Principle of Comparable Significance 
In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Singer presents, “the strong version of the principle of 
preventing bad outcomes”: “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”13 As 
before, let’s just look at the application to money and material possessions and let’s use a more 
descriptive title, namely, “The Principle of Comparable Significance.” 
PCS: Absolutely affluent persons are morally required to share their money, and 
the money that they can raise from liquidating their possessions, as long as (i) 
those donations will prevent something bad from happening, and (ii) that money 
and those possessions are not as morally significant as the bad thing that they 
prevent. An absolutely affluent person is not morally required to share money or 
possessions that are as morally significant as the bad thing that the resulting 
donations would prevent. 
 
Central to this principle is the concept of marginal utility at (ii). A donation crosses the 
point of marginal utility if, as a result of this donation, the donor falls into absolute poverty.   
Such donations do not achieve any net gain. It is important for students to recognize that PCS 
does not require making such donations. Instead, it requires making all of the donations short 
of this – that is, all of the donations that do not cross the point of marginal utility – that one 
can.  For this reason, PCS does not require persons to put their life at risk – at least not at 
immediate risk. Still PCS does demand that people in absolute affluence give until it hurts, then 
give some more, and then keep giving until they have made all the donations that they can as 
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long as those donations do not cross the point of marginal utility. This means coming right up 
against, but not crossing over into, absolute poverty.  
Students raise lots of objections to this principle. I will review a few that are especially 
instructive. One says PCS is unrealistic since virtually no one gives as much as PCS says they 
should. The obvious reply to this objection points out that it confuses normative ethics, which 
aims to identify how we ought to act, with descriptive ethics, which has the quite different task 
of describing how we do act. So too for a related objection which says that ethics must meet 
people where they are, that is, with their largely self-interested  dispositions, and state what 
such creatures ought to do. Several issues here are worth discussing. Is it true that we are largely 
self-interested?14 If so, is it inevitably true that we are largely self-interested? And are self-
interested dispositions open to moral criticism as long as we have the power to overcome them, 
no matter how difficult it is for us to overcome them?   
A third objection charges that PCS’s highly demanding nature counts against it.15 It is 
important to have students discuss whether the demandingness of a moral claim is a reason to 
reject it. They can be asked if the inference from x is very demanding to x is not morally 
required is valid. Does the answer depend on what, specifically, is required by a principle that is 
“very demanding”? What might, in particular circumstances, be required by a “very demanding” 
principle? And is the inference valid no matter the extent of what is required? In the end,  does 
this objection amount to anything more than the thought that acting morally needs to be easier 
than what would be involved in giving to the point of marginal utility? Students may be asked 
to consider whether the claim that someone is morally required to do something which is very 
demanding, is best judged by the merits of the specific arguments for and against that claim 
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quite apart from the demanding nature of x. On this approach, if an argument for engaging in a 
particular demanding course of action in a particular set of circumstances is sound then we will 
have discovered that morality, at least in this specific instance, is demanding. And if there is a 
sound argument that such a course of action is not morally required (where, again, the 
argument does not turn on whether the course of action is demanding), then we will have 
discovered that morality, at least in this specific instance, is not demanding.16 
A fourth objection, one that in my experience is quite popular with students, is that 
people in absolute affluence have a right to keep enough of their money for insurance purposes 
to guard against future misfortune that may befall them. On this view, it is permissible to stop 
giving before one reaches the point of marginal utility so that one can insure oneself against 
falling into absolute poverty should misfortune strike. This might be done by saving money or 
by purchasing various forms of insurance.  
To evaluate this objection, students can be asked to design a rescue situation that 
involves similar considerations. Here is one I have used to some effect. Suppose that there is a 
chance that the ship that I am on will encounter some problem and capsize. My lifejacket is my 
insurance against my losing my life if this should happen (as it will allow me to survive if my 
ship does capsize). Now imagine that a nearby ship capsizes, and someone from that ship is in 
the water, has no lifejacket, and will survive only if I throw him my lifejacket. Is it permissible 
for me to keep my lifejacket since it is my only insurance against drowning if my ship capsizes? 
Or am I morally required to throw it to the stranded person?  
As students sometimes note, the probabilities seem to matter here. This can be brought 
out by contrasting two cases. In one, it is very likely that my ship will capsize. In the other, it is 
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very unlikely that my ship will capsize. It seems much more plausible to say that it is 
permissible for me to keep my lifejacket in the first case than it is in the second case. If this is 
correct, then the crucial question is this: is someone in our society who foregoes insurance and 
gives to the point of marginal utility (without crossing over it) in circumstances that are more 
like my circumstances on the ship that is unlikely to capsize, or more like my circumstances on 
the ship that is likely to capsize? That is, if people do not set aside any money as insurance 
against going over the brink into absolute poverty (say if they were to lose their job), and 
instead keep themselves right at the brink, is it likely, or unlikely, that they will encounter 
circumstances that push them over the brink? 
A fifth objection,  another that students often raise, is that if everyone followed PCS, a 
huge amount of wealth would suddenly go from the first world to the underdeveloped world, 
and this would result in a shock to the world economy and great economic calamity.17 Is the 
fact that it is exceedingly unlikely that everyone will follow PCS grounds for rejecting this 
objection? Students can be asked about how this compares to the following: does the fact that 
economic calamity would ensue if everyone decided to be a plumber tomorrow – this being as 
unlikely as everyone following Singer’s edicts tomorrow – show anything about the morality of 
becoming a plumber?18  
 One last objection, perhaps the most compelling, charges that PCS is flawed because it 
is short sighted. If the spirit behind PCS is that one should save as many people as one can, 
then one will fail to accomplish this if one pushes oneself to the point of marginal utility. For 
example,  for a college student to reach the point of marginal utility, she would need to sacrifice 
her education since money she uses to pay her tuition could be used to save lives. The sacrifice 
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of her education means that she will not get a college degree with the result that she will 
probably make far less money during her lifetime. She will therefore not be in a position to save 
as many people as she would have been able to had she stayed in college. If her goal is to save 
as many people as she can, she should take a long-run view, invest in her education, and put 
herself in a position to help as many people as she can over the course of her entire life. 
 
4. The Maximum Long Run Principle  
The next principle explicitly emphasizes that we should do the most we can over the long run 
to lift people out of absolute poverty. The Maximum Long-Run Principle captures the basic 
idea: 
MLR: Absolutely affluent persons are morally required to share their money and 
the money they can raise from liquidating their possessions so as to, over the 
course of their entire life, bring the greatest number of people out of absolute 
poverty (without having to cross the point of marginal utility).19 
 
What does MLR imply about how much each of us should give? A key issue here is 
whether we are to take as given various features of our lives before applying this principle. For 
example, take someone who could have been a high-paid corporate officer, but instead 
becomes a low-paid school teacher. On one version of MLR, this person is morally required to 
give the amount that a low-paid teacher gives who, over her entire life, gets the greatest number 
of people out of absolute poverty.  Contrast this with what is delivered by a stronger version of 
MLR. It implies that this person is morally required to give the amount that would be given by 
a high paid corporate officer who, over her entire life, gets the greatest number of people out 
of absolute poverty. This amount will be significantly greater than the amount demanded by the 
weaker version of MLR. This person will also fail to meet this stronger moral obligation, but 
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now for the additional reason that she simply never made enough to meet it, though she could 
have if she had chosen the alternative career path. Similarly other key choice-points in a 
person’s life besides his or her choice of career can be held fixed (as the weaker version of 
MLR allows), or not (as the stronger version of MLR requires), for example, where a person 
lives, whether that person has children, and whether the person indulges in the expensive tastes 
that he/she has voluntarily cultivated.  Students can discuss whether this counts against the 
stronger version of MLR. 
 Besides the important distinction between the weak and strong versions of MLR, there 
is a second complexity. It arises because of  the huge number of investing and giving strategies 
that one might follow. Is it optimal to give as one earns, and donate weekly or monthly? Or is it 
better to invest one’s money, and perhaps save more lives if and when the resulting investment-
income gets added to one’s donation? When should one divest so as to make the greatest 
possible donation?20 The answers are far from obvious. 
 By taking a long-run, lifetime-policy approach to absolute poverty, MLR addresses a real 
shortcoming with Singer’s Pond Case, which is most naturally interpreted as a one-off case. 
Unlike the passerby in the Pond Case, a person in absolute affluence faces an enormous 
number of people who need to be rescued. One may save one person with a donation, but 
there is another person – hundreds of millions in fact – who are in equal need of help. It is as if, 
in surreal nightmarish fashion, life is nothing but a stroll by a pond in which numberless 
innocent individuals are dying and need one’s help if they are to survive. What is the moral life 
in this surreal nightmare? 
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 MLR delivers a very demanding answer. It deems almost all life-projects other than 
helping poor people immoral, though there might be exceptions in the form of projects that 
enhance the larger goal of saving poor people’s lives. For example, if you are a popular and 
good-selling artist, the most effective way for you to save lives might be to create and sell your 
art. Still, since MLR is going to crowd out almost all of one’s other projects and deem them 
immoral even (as we shall see) one’s competing ethical projects, MLR faces objections. Class 
discussion might take up at least the following two.21 
First MLR seems to crowd out the special obligations that we have to those who are 
near and dear to us.22 Students should be asked whether full conformity to MLR permits 
buying a holiday present for one’s child, or an anniversary gift for one’s spouse. As many 
students recognize, at first blush it looks like it does not since more lives can be saved by 
donating the money to others. But what if there are significant differences between the life in 
which one donates money to others instead of buying gifts for those with whom one has 
personal ties and the life in which one foregoes the donation and buys the gifts? The second 
life might be one in which one enjoys a more supportive and nourishing home environment 
than one would in the first life, thus enabling one to perform better at work and perhaps earn 
more money to donate. Even if this is true though, MLR will only permit one to buy the 
lowest- price gifts that will allow him or her to achieve the goal of lifting as many people as 
possible out of absolute poverty – spending any more than that will be a waste. This raises 
several questions. Does this proposal really recognize special obligations that persons have to 
their children and spouses?  Or does it make those obligations merely derivative from a more 
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fundamental obligation to distant strangers? And is it plausible that they are derivative in this 
way?  
A related objection connects to other themes that might arise, especially in a general 
survey course in applied ethics. According to this objection, MLR is true only if two other 
claims are true. One is that absolute poverty is the biggest moral problem in the world. The 
other is that only the biggest moral problem generates moral obligations that override all others. 
Both are worth discussing. The first is a fascinating topic that is seldom explored. What other 
moral problems might compete with world poverty for the title of being the biggest in the 
world? Expect students to suggest abortion, our treatment of animals, forms of discrimination, 
global warming, war, sweatshop labor practices, and others. Discussion here naturally leads to 
the criteria by which we should measure the size of various moral problems. However that 
turns out, what should we think of the claim that all other moral problems are to be neglected?  
Of course, it might be the case that even if world poverty is the biggest problem in the world, it 
is morally permissible to expend resources fighting lesser problems (but clearly not if the strong 
version of the MLR principle is correct).  It is worth asking students what sorts of 
considerations might support this view. Might an individual have the right to choose the ethical 
causes that he or she will pursue (even if it is only from a short list of the biggest more 
problems)? 
The view that there is this kind of leeway can be challenged with a case such as the 
following. Suppose someone on the way to a rally to protest recent legislation that will 
exacerbate global warming or to act on behalf of some cause other than one that targets the 
biggest moral problem in the world walks by a pond in which a child is drowning. Does this 
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person have a duty to save the child even if this means missing the important protest? This case 
suggests that there might not be such leeway after all, or at least that in some cases there is no 
such leeway. Does this suggest that there is no such leeway after all? 
 
5. The Same Absolute Amount Principle 
The three principles covered so far ground how much each of us should give in what each of 
us has as income and whether there are any people in absolute poverty that we can help. The 
last two principles have it that a third kind of fact helps to determine how much each of us 
should give: facts about other people who are in a position to give. 
Here it is helpful to have students think of absolute poverty as a problem of a certain 
size that has to be parceled out to the individuals in absolute affluence. The simplest way of 
doing this divides the problem evenly among the people in absolute affluence, thus making 
each affluent person morally required to eliminate the same share of poverty. This is captured 
by The Same Absolute Amount Principle:  
SAAP: An absolutely affluent person is morally required to share the amount of 
money equal to the total cost of raising everyone out of absolute poverty divided 
by the number of people in absolute affluence.23 
 
Since there are about 1.4 billion people in absolute poverty, and about 5.7 billion people in 
absolute affluence, there are roughly four times as many people in absolute affluence as there 
are people in absolute poverty.24 Therefore, according to SAAP, each person in absolute 
affluence should provide for one-quarter of a person in absolute poverty. At the very most, it 
costs $1.25 per day to get a person out of absolute poverty, since this is currently the minimum 
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amount needed to count as not being in absolute poverty.25 One quarter of $1.25 per day is 
31.25 cents per day, or $114 per year.26  
At least two objections to this principle are worth discussing. The first focuses on the 
fact that people in absolute affluence are not equally positioned to help out the world’s poor 
and that therefore each absolutely affluent person is not morally required to give the same 
amount. Take some examples at the extremes: Bill Gates is estimated to be worth around $50 
billion, while others are just barely above the $1.25 per day mark. SAAP says both are required 
to give the same amount. The objection charges that the view that each is required to give the 
same amount  is unreasonable on the grounds that Bill Gates will be unaffected by giving $114 
per year (in fact, he will probably be unaffected if he gives $114 million per year) while those 
living on little more than $1.25 per day will be very significantly affected. In fact, people in this 
second group will fall into absolute poverty as a result, something that even Singer’s PCS does 
not require of them. 
The following parallel pond case can be helpful here. Six children are drowning, this 
time in rough lake waters, when three adults pass by. One of the adults is a professional 
lifeguard. But the other two are merely proficient swimmers and each will be at serious risk of 
drowning if he or she tries to save more than one child.  SAAP says each adult is morally 
required to save two children. But surely respective abilities are relevant. If the good swimmer 
can easily save four, isn’t it more plausible that she is morally required to save four, and that the 
other two adults are morally required to save just one each?  
A second objection says that SAAP runs into a serious problem with apathy since it 
implies that when some people who are in a position to help are apathetic and do nothing, this 
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has no effect on the moral requirements that apply to others who are in a position to help.  
This is highly germane to poverty ethics since the vast majority of absolutely affluent people 
give far less than $114 per year to the world’s poorest people.27 Here is a key question for 
students to consider: are those affluent people who are disposed to help the poor morally 
required to pick up the slack created by the affluent people who, out of apathy,  do not give? 
Another pond case can help start class discussion here. Now there are ten children drowning in 
a shallow pond and ten adults passing by. All of the adults are perfectly capable of saving at 
least one child each. SAAP says each adult is morally required to save one child. But suppose 
that nine of the adults are apathetic and refuse to save any (though they are perfectly capable of 
doing so). Isn’t the tenth person morally required to save more than just one child? What if we 
add that the tenth adult can easily save more than one child, and perhaps even that she can 
easily save all ten (as it is a shallow pond)? It seems that she is morally required to save as many 
as she can. If this is correct, SAAP is false for it sets the bar too low. 
 
6. The Proportional Means Principle 
The final principle covered in the unit makes the amount that an affluent person is required to 
give vary according to her means. The greater a person’s means, the more she is morally 
required to give. A simple principle that captures this is The Proportional Means Principle: 
PMP: An absolutely affluent person is morally required to share (the amount of 
money equal to the total cost of raising everyone out of absolute poverty divided 
by the number of people in absolute affluence) multiplied by the  absolutely 
affluent person’s relative capacity to help. 
 
There are various ways to measure someone’s relative capacity to help. One is to peg the 
person in absolute affluence whose means puts him or her at the median among all who are in 
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absolute affluence, and say that that person is morally required to donate $114 per year.28 
Someone in the 25th percentile --75% of affluent people are richer than the median person, and 
25% are poorer-- would be morally required to donate 0.5 times the median amount, or $71 per 
year. Someone in the 75th percentile --25% of affluent people are richer than this person, and 
75% are poorer-- would be morally required to donate 1.5 times the median amount, or $171 
per year. And someone in the 100th percentile (namely, the world’s billionaires) would be 
morally required to donate twice the median amount, or $228 per year. This is just one way to 
measure a person’s relative capacity to help. Students can be encouraged to identify, and 
evaluate, others. 29  
How well does PMP, or at least this version of it, stand up against the two objections 
that were leveled against the last principle? The first charged that people of far greater means 
must be morally required to give more than those of meager means. PMP says that what 
someone ought to give depends in part on what he or she has, and that those with more are 
required to give more. Still some sliding scales seem to be more satisfactory at capturing this 
than others. For example, the version of PMP I just sketched might not be fully satisfactory 
since the most that it will assign to a person, even the wealthiest person in the world, is a moral 
obligation to donate $228 per year.   To many, this does not demand enough of millionaires 
and billionaires. Students can be encouraged to identify other versions of PMP with more 
acceptable implications for the very rich. 
What about the earlier apathy objection, according to which one can be morally required 
to do more when others who are also in a position to help do nothing?  Like the last principle, 
PMP makes no adjustment for the fact that, for reasons of apathy, very few people in absolute 
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affluence give anything close to what they should. So PMP is no better equipped than the last 
principle to deal with apathy. Close analogs of both PMP and SAAP that cover the resources 
(e.g. time, physical energy expended, etc.) relevant in pond cases, imply that it is morally 
permissible to let innocent children drown when it is easy and nearly cost-free to save them, 
just so long as there are others who can help, but fail to do so.   
 
Conclusion 
  I have outlined a unit that extends coverage of Singer’s work on our moral obligations 
to the world’s poorest people.  The focus of the unit is the sharing principles.  This unit will 
help students fill out their own views regarding this important moral obligation; it will deepen 
their interest in poverty ethics; it will help students develop skills relevant to identifying 
objections and replies; it will help them acquire powerful new concepts; and it will give them 
opportunities to reflect on some key related issues in ethics. It might also help them take more 
demanding principles like The Principle of Comparable Significance and The Maximum Long-




1.  The secondary literature on Singer’s work on this topic is enormous. Two helpful collections 
that contain many essays that are accessible to undergraduate students are Aiken and LaFollette 
ed.s, World Hunger and Moral Obligation (1st and 2nd ed.s), and Schaler ed., Peter Singer Under 
Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics. As for pedagogical pieces, neither the APA 
Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy nor Teaching Philosophy, two leading publications devoted 
to teaching philosophy, have published a single paper on pedagogical issues relating to Singer’s 
work on poverty ethics. 
 
2. Here is the pond analogy as Singer puts it in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” p.231: 
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“If I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in 
and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, 
while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.”  
Singer’s three-premise argument, as he puts it in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 
pp. 231-232: 
Premise 1: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. 
Premise 2: If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.   
Premise 3: It is in our power to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, 
and medical care, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance. 
 Conclusion: We ought, morally, to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, 
  shelter, and medical care.  
For a more recent formulation, see p.15-16 of The Life You Can Save.  
Singer has replied to many objections to his argument. These objections include the claim that 
physical proximity is morally relevant and his  view ignores this; that moral obligation 
diminishes when there are others who are positioned to help and his principle  fails to 
incorporate this; that disaster would ensue if every affluent person followed Singer’s advice; 
that his view is too far from common sense to be correct; that foreign aid is not the best means 
to saving poor people’s lives; that his argument ignores competing moral considerations based 
on special ties; and that we do not owe anything to those we have not wronged.3. “The Singer 
Solution to World Poverty” is very short and pursues an analogy that is very different from the 
pond analogy. The chapter from One World that is most germane to poverty ethics, chapter 
five, is largely devoted to arguing against strong forms of partialism, and to identifying our 
collective obligations to help the poorest people in the world.  
 
4. I devote two weeks to this companion unit. But more time, or less time, can be devoted to it. 
 
5. Singer spells out the distinction between absolute affluence and absolute poverty in 
numerous places, e.g. in Practical Ethics, p. 219-221. 
 
6. Though the focus is on how much of our money and possessions we should share with 
those in absolute poverty, there are other resources (as Singer is well aware) that we might 
share with those in absolute poverty, for example, our time, skills, vote, etc. Similar sharing 
principles can be formulated for each of these resources, though different considerations might 
bear on their assessment. I won’t address any of these issues here.. Nor will I say anything 
about whether we might be morally required to steal from others to save innocent lives: on this, 
see Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence, ch. 3. This is another 
fertile area for extending discussion of Singer’s work. 
 
7. At some point in class discussion, it might be helpful to distinguish a third question, namely, 
“What public statement about how much we should give will result in the greatest amount of 
giving?” Singer discusses this issue in several places; see Practical Ethics, p. 228, pp.. 245-6; The 
Life You Can Save, p. 151-154; and most recently in Singer and de Lazari-Radek, “Secrecy in 
Consequentialism: A Defense of Esoteric Morality.”  
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8. As a referee pointed out, there are challenging issues about how to complete this conditional 
if one thinks that people in absolute affluence do not have a moral obligation to share their 
resources with those in absolute poverty. How does one specify the grounds of a 
counterfactual obligation so that one can determine the value of X? The strategy I pursue in the 
rest of the paper involves examining a variety of considerations which presuppose that people 
in absolute affluence have a moral obligation to share some of their resources with people in 
absolute poverty, and which also bear on the specific issue of how much of their resources they 
are thus required to share. Keep in mind though that this kind of exercise in counterfactual 
moral reasoning is familiar, even if the details of it are not obvious. Reflecting on further 
examples, it is clear that there are good ways, and bad ways, of supporting these kinds of 
counterfactuals (or at least what people take to be counterfactuals). Consider two more 
examples that arise in applied ethics courses. People who believe capital punishment is not a 
morally permissible punishment for murder can evaluate various answers to this question: if 
capital punishment were a morally permissible punishment for murder, then what forms of it 
(e.g. lethal injection, public hanging, being boiled alive, etc.) would be morally permissible 
punishments for murder? And people who believe it is morally wrong to legalize physician-
assisted suicide can evaluate various answers to this question: if it were morally permissible to 
legalize physician-assisted suicide, then what would be the best legal safeguards for this 
practice? 
 
9. For reasons of brevity, I set aside whether the sharing principles might be supported by 
various ethical theories, such as versions of consequentialism, deontology, etc.  Notice that if 
such theories are more controversial than the sharing principles, then the theories cannot be 
used to adjudicate the sharing principles. 
 
10. See Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” p. 231. 
 
11. Singer provides a brief justification for leaving the notion of moral significance unexplicated 
in Practical Ethics, p. 231. 
 
12. Singer’s version of Unger’s Bob and the Bugatti case in “The Singer Solution to World 
Poverty” and The Life You Can Save, p. 13-14 is meant to illustrate this.  
  
13. See Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” p. 231. In The Life You Can Save, p. 15, 
Singer defends a principle that is less demanding than this principle but more demanding than 
PNS. It is: “If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing 
anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so.” However we don’t get much detail 
about what it is for one thing to be nearly as important as another thing. The most illuminating 
passage comes on p, 17, where Singer says this principle “leaves some wiggle room when it 
comes to situations in which, to prevent something bad, we would have to risk something 
nearly as important as the bad thing we are preventing. Consider, for example, a situation in 
which you can only prevent the deaths of other children by neglecting your own children. This 
standard does not require you to prevent the deaths of the other children.” 
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14. See Singer, The Life You Can Save, p. 73-78 for a detailed response to this objection. For 
gripping counterexamples to this view of human nature, see MacFarquhar’s “The Kindest Cut” 
and Parker’s “The Gift”, two essays that many students find fascinating. 
 
15. Singer discusses this objection in several places, including Practical Ethics, p. 242-6. 
 
16. However, as a referee  pointed out, the demandingness of an act might still bear on whether 
one is excused if one fails to perform it, and whether the moral requirement to perform it is 
overridden so that the action is not all-things-considered required.  
 
17. Singer discusses this objection at several places: for example, see The Life You Can Save, p. 
38-39. 
 
18. If the universalization version of Kant’s categorical imperative is covered earlier in a course, 
students might be asked to think about whether this objection correctly applies Kant’s 
universalization test. 
  
19. Singer recognizes long run considerations in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” p. 238; in 
Practical Ethics, p. 223; and The Life You Can Save, p. 37-38. But he does not discuss these 
considerations in detail. 
  
20. Singer discusses some of these issues in The Life You Can Save, p. 37-38. 
 
21. Some of the objections to PCS that I reviewed in the previous section can also be directed 
at MLR. I will focus on other objections to MLR. One that I do not discuss is the ‘moral saints’ 
problem raised in Wolf, “Moral Saints”. See Carbonell, “What Moral Saints Look Like” for an 
interesting, and accessible, reply to Wolf that appeals to the life of Paul Farmer. 
 
22. For Singer’s reply to this objection, see The Life You Can Save, chapter 8. 
 
23. Singer briefly discusses this principle in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” p. 233-4, and 
The Life You Can Save, p. 141. 
 
24. The present world population is about 7.1 billion. The division of all people into 1.4 billion 
who are in absolute poverty and 5.7 billion who are in absolute affluence assumes that these 
two categories are exhaustive. The usual definitions of ‘absolute poverty’ and ‘absolute 
affluence’ that I reviewed at the beginning of section 1 entail that they are exhaustive.  But 
against this perhaps those that live on exactly (or little more than) $1.25 per day should belong 
to a third category. On this approach, though fewer people will count as absolutely affluent, the 
final estimate that I arrive at of $114 per year is still roughly accurate given the compensating 
high estimate pointed out in the next footnote. 
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25. This is a high estimate because almost everyone in absolute poverty has some daily income 
and therefore does not fall short by the full $1.25 per day. 
 
26. For a very different way of calculating how much is needed to eliminate absolute poverty as 
well as the number of rich people that it would take to do this, see The Life You Can Save, 
chapter 9. It comes to $200-$400 per rich person per year.  
 
27. Singer reports, in The Life You Can Save, p. 33, that Americans donate, via government 
foreign aid and private giving, just 18 cents of every $100 of national income. The figure is 
based on OECD data from 2007.  
 
28. So the number of affluent people who are richer than this person is equal to the number of 
affluent people who are poorer than this person. 
 
29. Another sliding scale results if each affluent person is required to sacrifice the same amount 
of well-being. I have in mind the notion of well-being discussed in ethical theory.  Of course 
there are substantive disputes about the nature of well-being. But on many views of well-being, 
the corresponding amount of money will differ considerably from person to person depending 
on how much wealth a person has and how much a given loss in wealth will affect his or her 
well-being.  
 
30. Many thanks to four anonymous referees, and the many students in my Introduction to 
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